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llt First South Street, 
City, Utah, 
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There being 3 volumes of record in the consolidated cases, for 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOME ELECTRIC CORPORATION, 
a rorporation, 
Plaintif !-Respondent 
vs. 
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and MRS. 
GEORGE R. RUSSELL, his wife, 
Defedants-Respondents, 
and 
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and 
RETTA 0. RUSSELL, 
vs. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a California Corporation, 
et al. 
Third Party Defendants and 
Appellant. 
KENNETH E. SMITH COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and MRS. 
GEORGE R. RUSSELL, his wife 
and 
Defendants-Respondents, 
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and 
RETTA 0. RUSSELL, 
Third Party Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
vs. 
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE 
CmIPANY, a California corporation, et al. 
Third Party Defendant and 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 10382 
No. 10383 
8TA'l1E.MENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Thi• actions of Honw Electric Corporation and of 
KPn11<>t '1 f'~. Smith ·Company wf're consolidated for trial 
in tliP lowPr court, (RA 31), because the cases involved 
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the same is~mPs and facts they are then•fore eonsolidat('d 
in this brief on appeal. vVhilP ,judgment was Pl1!t·1·pd 
against defendants George R. Russell and Retta O. Hn, 
sell, each of whom had pleaded over under their third 
party complaints and each of whom were awarded judg-
ment over against appellant Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company and against Deseret Construction & 
Investments, Inc., a corporation, this appeal is taken 
by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company only. 
The actions were brought by Home Electric Cor. 
poration in the one case, and by Kenneth E. Smith Com-
pany in the other case, as against defendants Russell to 
recover the cost of materials furnished to Russells by 
each of said plaintiffs in the construction of a home on 
unimproved property belonging to Russells, Russells 
having failed to require a bond for the protertion of 
mechanic's and materialmen who furnished lahor and 
materials to Russells. Russells financed the building 
through a loan evidenced by a mortgage and note giwn 
by them to appellant Pacific Mutual Life Insuranee 
Company, the monies from which loan were advanePd 
by the agent of Pacific l\Iutual Life Insurance Companr 
to the general contractor as the building progressPd ac-
cording to a written agreement made and enten·d into 
by and between Russells and Pacific Mutual Lif1' fnsur 
ance Company. Russells also entered into a written 
contract for the construction of the building on tlwir 
property with Deseret Construction & InvPstnwnb. lni·. 
as general contractor. 
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Dl~PO~l'l'JON OF CARE MADE IN LO\VER COURT 
Tl11• lmn--r court entered a judgment dated February 
. , 1 !Hi;) in th<-> case instituted by Home Electric Cor-
porat i011 (No. 10382) in favor of plaintiff Home Electric 
( '01 poration and agaim3t George R. Russell and Retta 
(J. Hu:-;:-:(•11, his wifo, in thP sum of $347.42 with interest 
th1·n·on at tlw ratP of 8'/r per annum, and in favor of 
( !1·01',i!.•' H. Russell and Retta 0. Russell, his wife, on 
1h1·ir third party emnvlaint, against Pacific Mutual Life 
ln:-:man('t' Company, and Deseret Construction & Invest-
11wnt:-;, Inc., in th<-> same amount. 
The lo\\'Pr court entered a judgment, dated Febru-
an· .... , 19()5 in the case instituted by Kenneth E. 
:-lmith Company, (No. 10383) in favor of plaintiff, Ken-
11..th I•~. Rmith Company and against George R. Russell 
and RPtta 0. Russell, his wife, in the sum of $945.06 
11 it h intPrf'st thPrPon at the rate of 8% per annum, and 
in favor of 0<->orge R. Russell and Retta 0. Russell, his 
\l'ifr, on thf'ir third party complaint, against Pacific Mu-
tual Lifr lnsurancP Company, and Deseret Construction 
& lnY1•:-:tim•nts Inc., in the same amount. 
IU~LlEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
AppPllant, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company 
~1·Pb r·pwr:-:al of the judgments as the same affect this 
appdlant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants George R. Russell and Retta O. Russr!J 
his wife, the owners of unimproved real property i~ 
Salt Lake County, Utah, a building lot described as. Lnl 
511, Arcadia Heights Plat "E," did on January l7tJ
1 
1961, enter into a construction agreement with Third 
Party Defendant, Deseret Construction and InveHtlllf'llt>. 
Inc., for the construction of a home on said propprtr, 
at a stated cost, (R A 6). Russells did not requirP 
Deseret Construction and Investments, Inc. to furnisJ1 
a performance bond as provided by Sec. 14-2-2 lJ:CA. 
1953. 
In order to finance the construction of a homf' on 
their lot, Russells borrowed the sum of $17 ,000.00 frmu 
Third Party Defendant, appellant, Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance Company, executing and delivering a promis-
sory note and mortgage on said property to secure sairl 
sum. Prior to and to induce appellant to make sairl 
loan, Russells executed and delivered to said loan com-
pany a construction agreement, which was made a part 
of the mortgage by reference, which agreement is at-
tached to and made a part of Russells' Third Part\ 
Complaint, (RA 9, 10). Under said agreement Russellf 
agreed with Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company t" 
diligently improve said property at a cost of not le8s 
than $18,168.00 in accordance with plans and specifiea-
tions and general building contract (if any) approved 
by Lender (Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company). 
and to furnish Pacific Mutual Life Insurance CompanY 
--
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1ritl1 n·e<•ipted bills for all work or materials furnished 
1,,r ~ueh improvements and to remit to said loaning 
a~eney such other amounts as it may from time to time 
1,.qui n· in addition to such loan funds to assure full 
paynwnt for such improvements. 
Th<· said construction agreement further provided 
that ''subject to all conditions herein provided, Lender 
-hall dishun;e such loan funds and the amount of all 
~nch remittances either to Owner or Order, or in Lend-
1·r\; sole discretion, from time to time, without liability 
~11 to <lo or for so doing, to any architect, engineer, 
(u11tractor, subcontractor, mechanic or materialman en-
µ:ag-ed in or furnishing any work or material for such 
rniprowrnents or any part thereof, as follows: " (then 
in typewritt<:~n figures and letters is set out five para-
graphs designating the method of advances as the build-
ing progressed, the first four being unimportant to the 
ease, thr fifth paragraph provides:) "$4000.00 (being 
thr• last draw of the mortgage money) after house is com-
plPtPd according to plans and specifications now on file 
in LPnder's Office, yard has been graded, and all bills 
for rnatPrial and labor have been paid." The other pro-
;·isions of said agreement herein referred to are printed 
crnd further provide: "Lender in its sole discretion may 
f rorn ti111P to time make any or all such disbursements 
without the occurence of any or all conditions hereto 
and upon default in performance of any obligation of 
1 Jwn<•r hPrein or in said loan application or secured by 
,;iid mortgage or trust deed, may itself for its own 
irnt<'rtion and without liability so to do or for so doing 
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cause such improvements to be completed and any or 
all such obligations to be performed and disburse such 
loan funds and the amount of all such remittances or am 
part thereof as above provided or in payment or satis-
faction of any or all such obligations of Owner." 
Appellant deposited said loan fund with Backman 
Abstract & Title Company for disbursement. Not only 
were these loan funds deposited with Backman Abstraet 
& ·Title Company but Russells also deposited with said 
title company the sum of $1663.00 for disbursement \rith 
the loan funds (R B 14). 
Defendants and respondents Russells went to thr 
office of Backman Abstract & Title Co. and executed 
the note and mortgage in favor of Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance Company (R B 16), and LeGrand Backman 
of the title company was told by Russells that the general 
contractor on the job was Deseret Construction & In-
vestments, Inc. (R B 17). Funds were thereafter issued 
to the general contractor as follows: Mr. Tatro, tlw 
general manager of said company would go to the office 
of Backman Abstract & Title Company with vouchers 
of checks issued to sub-contractors. Mr. Backman woulr1 
then total the amount represented by these voucher' 
and issue a check for the Russell account to Desrrt>t 
Construction & Investments Inc., for said amount. Thi> 
method was followed during the entire construction 
period (R B 18). All of the funds were paid out from 
the Russell account to Deseret Construction & Invest-
ments, Inc., the general contractor (R B 20). The titl~ 
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(. 0111 pan:-· did not have a list of the sub-contractors, had 
no know IedgP as to who they were and made no payment 
1,\ a11:- suh-eontraetors, but all payments were made to 
tlw gPll('J'<d eontraetor, Deseret Construction & Invest-
:1wnt~, lnr. ( R B 20). 
Tilt- plaintiff, respondents, who were materialmen, 
~11h-<·<mtraetors, were not fully paid by the general con-
trador. As a result these cases were filed by them 
<tgninst dPft•ndants, respondents Russells, who filed 
adion under their third party complaint and obtained 
j111l!.!,'ltt<"nt ovPr against Deseret Construction & Invest-
1111·nts, Inc. and Pacific :Mutual Life Insurance Company, 
tlj(' latt('l' being appellant herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE ACTION, 
MADE AFTER THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS, RUS-
SELLS, RESTED, ON THE GROUND FROM THE 
EVIDENCE AND FACTS AND LAW THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS HAD SHOWN NO RIGHT TO RELIEF 
AS AGAINST PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
Tlw uncontradicted evidence is that appellant's 
apynt, upon completion of the construction, had paid to 
D<'H·n·t ( ~onstruction & Investments, Inc., the general 
<"mtrador, the monies deposited with said company (R 
B 20, :w). Tlw construction agreement betwPen the Rus-
·i·l 1:- a]l(l Paeific l\Iutual Life Insurance Co. was in evi-
,J. 11<· 1•• frnrn whielt it is clParly Sl'en that it was essential 
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that the funds provided under the mortgage would, under 
the construction agreement, be employed exclusively in 
the erection of the home on the property mortgaged, 
since the security for the loan only came into existenn 
as work progressed according to settlf'd plans and sp"" 
ifications. This is basic to construction financing and 
is often emphasized where the role of construction lPnd-
ing is compared and contrasted with mortgage practic~., 
generally. In such cases, the loaning institution insisti 
upon control over expenditures and payments to insun· 
completion of the improvement because of the risks in-
herent in this form of lending. It is to insure that 
sufficient funds are available to complete the improve-
ment and the agreement gives the loaning agency th( 
right to pay to the contractor or parties furnishing tlw 
materials and labor or, at the option of the lender, to 
the mortgagor to be applied by the latter for this pur-
pose. The re ten ti on of funds by the lender together with 
authority to make direct disbursements follow naturally 
from recognition of the fact that completion of tlw 
structure is of paramount importance in this type nf 
security arrangement. 
The authority given to appellant under the construc-
tion agreement is a device commonly required of the 
mortgagor in such construction, as a means of protecting 
the lender against claims of negligence or other im 
propriety in the disbursement procedure; it does not 
affect the lender's obligation to perform when the terllli 
of the agreement have been met. This is the usual prn-
cedure followed in construction loan financing. It i~ 
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~tah·rl, for Pxample, in a study of mortgage practices 
that 
" ... progress payments for work in place may be 
made to either the general contractor in a lwnp 
:-:m11 or to each of the subcontractors, in the dis-
c·rd ion of the mortgagee. The decision is based 
on the lender's estimate of the financial and ad-
ministrative responsibility of the general con-
tractor and his ability to procure the necessary 
waivers of lien and supporting affidavits from 
tlH' subcontractors. (italics added) 
An authorization from the owner to the mort-
gagee . . . to disburse the proceeds of the loan 
in accordance with the contractor's statement is, 
of course, a prerequisite to any disbursement." 
PeasP and Kerwood Mortgage Banking 312 (2d 
Pd. 1965) 
The authorization contained in the Construction 
AgwPment in the instant cases is a socalled "blanket" 
authority to disburse. It has been noted that some 
lPnrler:-: require the borrower to authorize individual 
rfodmnw11wnts at all stages of construction. Conway 
.\[ortgage Lf•nding 340 (1960). In any event the pur-
po:-:p i:-: e!Par. It is natural that the mortgagee should 
c;(·ek Jmlt<)dion against the consequences of improper 
<lislmrsP!llPnt:-:, in vie"\v of the complexity of factual 
dPtf'rn1ination with which a construction mortgagee is 
(·onfrontc·d whih• thP building is being erected. (Falls, 
LumhPr Co. v. Hernan, 114 Ohio App. 262 (1961) ). Thus 
thp authorization by its terms releases the mortgagee 
frn1t1 liahili(v for errors of judgment in making disburse-
11H"l1l Ind 1wt for wilful misconduct. 
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No wilful misconduct is shown in thet-·W casps on 1;, 
part of the disbursing ag<'nt and none is chargC'd. '!'Ji, 
evidence shows elearly that if a mistalrn was rnadt', whir·' 
is not admitted, it was error of judguwnt in relyin~ 11r 
representations of the general contractor. It is evickn· 
that the disbursing agent had, on other occasions ch,a1· 
with the general contractor in the same manner on oth1·: 
jobs (R B 17, 18), and these dealings with thf' genPrai 
contractor were conducted in a satisfactory manner (RB 
20, 21). 
It has been said that the need for individual jud~ 
ment in making disbursements under construction mort-
gage financing is reflected in the agreement entered into 
by the lender and borrower. An instance is Whiti1111-
M ead Co. v. West Coast Bond and Mortgage Co. 15; 
P2d 629 (Cal. 1944) where the loan terms contained thii 
language: 
"The owner hereby authorizes the lender, at 
any time at its option, either in its own or !bl' 
owner's name to do any and all things necessary 
or expedient in the opinion of the lender to secun· 
the erection and completion of the improvementi 
in accordance with the plans and specifications 
... and to make or withhold payments for labor 
and materials used in the construction, and to d1J 
any and every act or thing appertaining to or 
arising out of the construction or completion of 
h . t " t e 1mprovemen s .... 
1The parties to a contract are free to define its term~ 
In the instant cases we have a contract in which thi 
borrowers agre(' to improve unimproved property owni·ii 
11 
\,\ 1l1PJll at a c·ost of 11ot less than $18,lGS.OO. They 
;1:.~n·<·d to furnish to LPnder recPiptP<l bills for all work 
11 r rnat1>riaJ:.; l\nnished for such improvements and to 
,., 111if In f,('J/(ler such other amounts as it may from time 
/11 ti111!' require in addition to such loa11 funds to assure 
1111! 1111y111c11t for such impr01;ements. Not only this but 
tlw horro\n'rs authorized the Lender to disburse such 
Joan funds and the amount of all such remittances either 
to tlw 01l'llcr or order or in Lender's sole discretion, 
l'rn111 ti11w to time, without liability so to do or for so 
dinir, to :my architect, engineer, contractor, subcontrac-
tor, Jll<'<'hanie or materialman engaged in or furnishing 
an>· work or material for such improvements or any 
part thPn"'of. Tlwn the parties specified the manner 
un<ln whi<·h advancements may be made and further 
a~rPP<l that tlw Lender in its sole discretion may from 
tillH· to time mak<> any or all such disbursements without 
ilil' ocrnn,11ce of any or all conditions thereto. 
As hPretofore stated, even with such provisions con-
t ai1wcl i11 the agreement between the borrowers and the 
Ji.11dPr, it is concech~d that the lender would not be ex-
1·11~Pd from wilful misconduct. But it is contended that 
tl1P l<>rnlPr is not liable for errors of judgment and the 
l1·1HlPr is Psp0cially not liable under the facts of the 
in~tant <'asps where the general contractor represented 
tn thP lendt>r's disbun;ing agent, that the claims repre-
~1·ntrcl by thP vouchers produced to the disbursing agent 
\I Pre· all of tlw outstanding claims and that they would 
Ii:· full~· satisfi<>d out of the final draw. 
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For the trial court to find against apprllant it ''" 
necessary that the evidence show wilful misconduct 
01 
the part of the disbursing agent. This was neith, 
pleaded nor was any suggestion of such made durin 
the trial of the case. 
The borrows failed to comply with the terms of th 
Construction Agreement if receipted bills for material 
were not furnished to the Lender. If the building ro, 
more than the contract price, as the general contractor 
testified, then the borrowers not the Lender as the tria
1 
court has adjudged, are obligated under the terms 111 
their agreement to furnish such addition funds as are 
required to fully pay for the building. 
While no claim is made that the Construction AgrPt 
ment is not intended to protect the borrower, the real 
purpose in the Lender's requirement that such an agree. 
ment be executed is because it becomes an essential parr 
of the security arrangement providing the only mean.' 
of assuring that ample funds will be available to eom 
plete the construction. 
As was held by this Honorable Court in thr W' 
of Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham, 12 U. 2d 335, 366P 
2d 598, when the premises are improved the mortgage' 
became bound by virtue of its agreement to advanc1 
the specific sums to pay therefor. 
Bv its decision in this case the trial court entird1 
ignore.cl the provisions of the written agreement k 
tween the borrowers and the lenders and frustrated tlw 
intention of the parties to the agreement; 
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Corbin on Contracts says: 
"l f the parties have concluded a transaction 
to which is appears that they intend to make a 
contract, the court should not frustrate their in-
tPntion if it is possible to reach a fair and just 
rPsult, even though this requires a choice among 
conflicting meanings and the filling of some gaps 
that the parties have left." (Corbin, Contracts 
Sec.%) 
The dc·cision of the Lender's agent, in advancing the 
111ortgage monies under the circumstances of this case 
\ms reasonable. He exercised the discretionary power 
given him nndPr the contract in paying the monies over 
to the general contractor. There was no obligation on 
his part to determine who the sub-contractors were or 
whetlwr they were paid. That was the responsibility of 
thr genPral eontractor who was hired by third party 
plaintiffs. 'rhe Lender followed the accepted practice 
in ::;ueh cast>s in paying the monies to the general con-
trndor, when the work was completed. 
'l11w derision from which this appeal is taken is not 
m accord with the recognized rule of contract interpreta-
tion. ''Whenever possible a contract should be so con-
:-;trnrd that there are mutually binding promises on each 
varty." Ross V. Producers Mut. Ins. Co. 4 U2d 396, 295 
P. 2d ~3D. And, perhaps most important, in determining 
lioth the ''meaning and the legal effect of an agreement, 
the transaction should be considered as a whole." Corbin, 
Contracts, Sec. 549. This of course requires considera-
1 i!on of the "nature of the business at hand, the purpose 
14 
of tlw parti<·s to th0 tram;;action, and otlH·r r0h·wn1
1 
•• 
'· 
cnmstanePs." Corbin, Contract:-:, S<'c. !);)(), 
It is Pvid<>nt in tlw instant ('asps that tlu• \\'ork 
1 
thP construction of tlw irnprov<'lll<'nts on hon011·p:' 
propPrty had hP<'n cornpld<>d as was n•prPs<'nt<>ct 1o a· 
I 
pellant's ag-Pnt h>- th<• g<•1wral <'ontractor. ThPrl'f1,i 
thP ap1wllant was ohligat<>d to a<lvanee th<' monirs ]i1· 
by it to PH>' for tlw sanw. S<•<• l'tah 8arj11,qs <C Lr111 11 
Jlfrclrn m, 1 :Z l ~. 2d 338, 36fi P. 2d 598. This appt>llant di1: 
Tlw fact that th<'n' W<'r<' not snffiei<>nt moniPs in ti 
a<'<'onnt to pa>- tlw sub-contractors in full was no faui' 
of appPllant. Y Pt th0 trial court held that becarnw a11 
pPllant's agPnt did not s0e to the application of t)1. 
moni<'s beyond the gPnf'ral contractor, appellant is liahl 
for th0 shortage in funds. That is the effeet of th, 
d(•cision in tlwse cases. Had appellant's agent advancr·1i 
the moniPs before th0 work and materials required fr,· 
thP completion of the building were furnished, then ap 
pdlant might be liable to the borrower in that casr tlwr· 
being no obligation on the part of appellant to adYaJ!t 
the funds. However, as heretofore stated, th<' evidew 
is to the effect that the construction of the irnprowmH 
was complete when the final draw was made b~· tlw i!'"r 
eral contractor. (R B 30). 
There is no evidence in these cases to support tl1· 
Court's finding against appellant. There is not a scintill: 
of evid0n<'e that anv of the monies held by appellant'~ 
a<rpnt "·ent elsewhe~·e than into the construction. Sud· 
h ' 
is not even contend<>d h~- respondents. Respondent· 
onl>· <'OntPntion is that appellant's agent was ohlig-at"' 
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tu H'(' 1 hat all suh-<'ontractors were paid, wlwther or not 
tli1 r<· was suffi<'iPnt money in the account. The trial 
,·1111rt t>nti n•I>' if.,rnored the obligations of the borrowers 
:1nd1·1 tli<· <'onstnwtion agTt-f•rnent and applied one sen-
: .. 11cl' tlwn·in against appellant, when it was evident 
i'11)Jll the g(•nPral contractor's tPstimony in the record 
tli:1t in ordt>r to pay for the construction of tht- improve-
11wnts it was rn•cessary for the general contractor to 
draw th(· monit-s on deposit for such purpose (R B 30). 
Thi· whole of thP C'ontract must be considered, one para-
~rnp}1 ('amiot be pickt-d out and applied without the 
(·onsidL•ration of the whole contract. ~rhis is a cardinal 
rull' in thP construction of contracts. 
In l 7 A CJS 8ec. 297 at page 112 it is stated: 
''The intention, or purpose, of the parties to 
a contract is to be collected, ascertained, or gath-
Pred from the entire instrument, or the instrument 
as a whole, and not from detached or isolated 
portions, or provisions, or fragmentary parts, 
and it is necessary to consider all of its parts 
or provisions in order to determine the meaning 
of an>' particular part." 
Tlw Ptah ('OUrts follo\'.red this rule in General Mills, 
f 11 1•. c. ( 'ra.q1111, 1:~+ P2d 1089 and in Vitagraph, Inc. v . 
.l111rrican Theatre Co., 77 U. 71, 291 P. 303. 
Dishnnw111t>nt proet>durt> is s<'t out in paragraph 3 
,,f the ennstrnction agre<>ment. It provides for payments 
""
1>rding to progrPss of construction in the amounts set 
! '·l'l Ii tl11•rpin and confers upon the mortgagee the option 
· 1 1 :lit~ ing pay111Pnts either to the mortgagor (owner) 
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or order, or to contractors, materialmen. sub-contract,. 
or mechanics or any of them without liability so to,: 
or for so doing. This simply prPscribes the mann. 
in which performance undPr one of the alternativP~ rir" 
to the mortgagee would be undertaken. The disbur~. 
ment clause and the authorization provision therPin a: 
not inconsistent and gi\e the mortgagee an option as· 
mode of performance. This contract gave the mort~ag,. 
the right to ad\ance funds as construction progrw~ 
in accordance with settled plans and specifications: ti· 
obligation could be discharged by payment to the Ow1w 
or, at the option of the mortgagee, directly to the Cl''. 
tractor, or subcontractors: if the method of payrner· 
to the contractor were adopted. the mortgagee pomss~~ 
authority to make payments directly to this dPsi~nat·. 
contractor and reserved the right to exercise discretiN 
in making particular payouts. 
The obligation of the mortgagee to disburse fund· 
is contingent upon adequate perfonnance warrantin: 
such disbursement. This concept is basic to construrti,,: 
financing and has recei\ed acknowledgment in a nurnl• 
of decisions. In Boise Payettr Lumber Co. r. Tri1wi:r 
~76 Pac. 971. for example. it is sai<l: 
"The mortgagee's obligation was to adrnnr 
the balance of the funds represented by the mn.r~ 
gage note upon compliance by the mortgagor mt 
the conditions of the agreement. \iz .. the impr01 • 
ment of the premises." 
And when performance has been satisfactory. the obli~:: 
tion of the mortgagee is fixed: 
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''The }Jremises were improved and the mort-
gagee b(•came bound by virtue of the construction 
agrPPlJl(•nt to advance the specific sums to pay 
therefor." 
That i~ to say, the obligation to disburse is con-
' lllg<'llt upon adt•quate performance. Performance was 
ad!'qnatP in the instant case and the general contractor 
"a.' f'ntitle<l to receive the monies which were promised 
to lw pai<l to him upon such performance. 
TlwrP is no evidence in these cases to show that the 
111oni<'s paid out by appellant's agent to the general 
cimtraetor di<l not go into the construction of the home 
of third party plaintiff, Russells. On the contrary, the 
.,yidi•nce shows that all monies did go into the improve-
11wnts. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND RE-
FUSING TO FIND THAT DESERET CONSTRUC-
TION & INVESTl\IENTS, INC. WAS ACTING AS 
AGENT FOR THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS, RUS-
SELLS. AT ALL Til\IES AND PARTICULARLY IN 
RECEIVING THE MORTGAGE MONIES FROM AP-
PELLANT'S AGENT AND IN FAILING AND RE-
FTSING TO INVOKE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THIRD 
PARTY PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF APPEL-
LANT. 
Third party plaintiffs Russells in their answer and 
Third-Party Complaint in each case pleaded under their 
Fir"t Cause of Action as follows: 
1. That on or about the 17th day of January, 
19Gl, the defendants George R. Russell and 
Hetta 0. Russell, his wife, entered into a con-
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struction agreement with the third-party d, 
fendant, Deseret Construction and r~w,· 
ments, Inc., wherein third-party def<'ndai 
agreed to construct a home on the fo]] 011 1l 
described property, to-wit: 
Lot 511, Arcadia Heights Plat ''1<~ " aeenr ' ': to the official plat thereof, 
which property was and is now owned by t1. 
defendants Russell. 
2. That the defendants Russell have fullv pa:. 
said third-party defendant, Deseret Co~strur· 
tion and Investments, Inc., for the constru1· 
tion of said home, but said third-part>· d, 
f endant has failed to pay the obligation~ ir 
connection with said construction, . includim 
the alleged obligation of (here is set out tll' 
party plaintiff and the amount claimed in ead 
case). 
Third party plaintiffs plead that they have ful!\ 
paid the general contractor. 
It is not claimed by third party plaintiffs that D,., 
eret Construction & InvestnH'nt::-; was not authorized h• 
them to draw the monies on dt>posit with appellan( 
agent to pay for the construction of the irnprovrlll('Jil' 
The evidenr0 is to the effrct that third party plai11!il1· 
authorized and expected Deseret Construction & lnvl'~' 
rnents, Inr. to drm,· the monies as the building 11rr 
gressed. This it did as general contractor. 
It would appear from these facts that it is elenwn 
tary that Deseret Construction & Investnwnts, Inc. act,,,: 
at all times as agent for third party plaintiffs contral'I 
ing with sub-contractors and materiahnen and in dra11111· 
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,,11 tlw funds to pay for same. [t is evident that third 
part:: plaintiffs knew at all times that Deseret Construc-
tw11 & I 11vt>st1rn~nts, Inc. was drawing on said funds. 
Then· was no rneam; of paying the contractor other than 
to dra\\ on said funds. The court should have invoked 
.. ~toprwl in thir<llparty plaintiff's action against appel-
lant. For the eourt to find against appellant as it did 
:,, to find that third-party plaintiffs may recover from 
:1ppt>llant rnoni('s paid on deposit by appellant to third-
party plaintiffs. 
In ;3 A111 . .J ur.2d Agency Sec. 20 the law is stated: 
'·rrhe question of whether an agency has been 
<"!'Pated is ordinarily a question of fact which may 
lw Pstahlished the same as any other fact, either 
hy dirPct or by circumstantial evidence; and 
whdhPr an agency has in fact been created is to 
he dt•tennined by the relations of the parties as 
they exist under the agreements or acts, with 
thr qlwstion being ultimately one of intention .... 
and if relations exist which will constitute an 
agt>ney, it will be an agency whether the parties 
1md<'rstood the exact natun.• of the relation or 
not. Moreover, the manner in which the parties 
d1,signatP tht• relationship is not controlling, and 
if an ad done by one person in behalf of an-
othPr is in its essential nature one of agency, 
tl1e one is the agent of such other notwithstanding 
liP is not so called." 
.\ppPllant's agPnt relied on the repn'sentativPs made 
J,, thiJ'(l-part~· plaintiffs' agent; if the rPpn,sPntations 
ii " 1 (· fals1>, third-party plaintiffs cannot look to appPl-
:,, ,,t to rl·eowr for the fraud of third-party plaintiffs' 
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EvPn if it appParPd that third-party plainti!· 
agent, Deseret Construction & Investments, Inc., ilr. 
said monies and did not apply the sa11w toward paymi·r 
of materialmen, which the evidence does not rrfl, ... 
third-party plaintiffs, having placed their agt>nt in 
111
,, 
tion to commit a fraud on appellant, must suffer,: .. 
appellant. SeP Eanwe ·i:. Big Bear Land & Watrr 1 
(Cal. 220 P2d 408, -! of syllabus, 2 CJS Agenc~', SPr. ]Ii" 
pages 1270 et. seq.) 
In 3 1CJS Agency at page 187 the law is statrd a· 
follows: 
"The principal is liable although the agent, 
negligence causing the tort occurs while the agen: 
is deviating from the method in which he ha 
been directed to perform the principal's businf's~ ·· 
In Martin v. Leatham, (Cal.) 71 P2d 336, it is ~a1· 
in citing the case of Johnson v. Monson, 183 Cal. rn. 
190 P. 635, wherein the court quotes from Otis Elcratu• 
Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 163 Cal. 31, 39, 124 P. iO+.; 
L.R.A. (NS) 529, as follows: 
"It is the general doctrine of the law, as it · 
our statutory rule, that a principal is liahl'.· ; 
third parties not only for the nPgligenct> o.t 1" 
agent in the transaction of the busine:;s ot ti. 
agency, but likewise for the frauds, torts. or otht. 
wrongful acts committed by such age?t m a~il d'. 
a part of the transaction of such busmess, c1 ~.ill· 
Story on Agency, Sec. 452, Sherman & Rk'dtii·i·: 
on Negligence, Sec. 65. 
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In [)1,Mirjiau r. Ideal Heating Corp. (Cal.) 2-!G P2d 
.-JI. it is said: 
''Unless required by law to employ a particular 
awlnt, a principal is responsible to third persons 
for n<'gligence of his agent in transaction of bnsi-
n<>ss of agency, including wrongful acts committed 
hv f'Uf'h agent as part of transaction of such bnsi-
n~ss, and for his wilful omission to fulfill the 
obligations of the principal." 
lu r1111ghn '/). Board of Police Com'rs. (Cal.) 140 
l'~d 130 it is held. A principal is liable for torts of his 
ag(•11t co111111ittPd within scope of his authority under 
dudrirn• of 'rPspondt>nt superior.' 
POINT III. 
TH~ COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND RE-
FUSING TO ADOPT THE PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
1\fENT SUBMITTED BY APPELLANT. 
There was no Pvidt>nce introduced in the case to sup-
p111 t the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
111/'nt suhmittrd by third-party plaintiffs and adopted by 
tJH· court. There ~was evidence supporting the Findings 
11f Fad, Condusiom; of Law and Judgment submitted by 
a PT'(· lla n t. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
TherP lwing no evidence before the court to support 
th(' Findings of 1'-.act, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, 
1lH· 1·onrt should have granted a new trial. 
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CON"CLlif-ilON 
Third-Part~' Plaintiff/.; having h~' th1:1ir writtrn agrPr 
ment authorized app<>llant to pay rnoniPs lwl<l hy it tn 
the gen<>ral contractor for tlH' construction of improw 
nwnts on prop<>rty of third-party plaintiffs, an<l the con. 
struction having h0en completed requiring tlw drawin~ 
do\vn of all moniPs on deposit for said purposes, thi 
judgmPnt of tlw lower court should h0 rewrsed and thP 
actions as against app01lant should lw dismissPd. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Backman, Backman & Clarl 
1111 Deseret Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for nppdlanl. 
